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SUPPORT v. ALIMONY IN VIRGINIA: IT'S TIME TO USE
THE REVISED STATUTES
Joel H. Holt*
The concept of alimony has been a traditional fixture in the law
of divorce ever since the early common law. Since the church was
the foundation for the institution of marriage, it was only logical
that the separation of husband and wife was a matter for the eccle-
siastical courts in early England. Ecclesiastical decrees, however,
did not dissolve the marriage but only resulted in a "legal" separa-
tion, commonly known as a divorce a mensa et thoro.t In making
such a decree, it was obviously necessary for the courts to make a
discretionary award of support for the wife since at common law the
husband exercised virtually absolute control over all of the wife's
property, both real and personal, once the parties were married.
2
With the development of the absolute divorce, commonly known
as divorce a vinculo matrimonii, the original purpose for granting
alimony disappeared since courts could now dispose of all marital
property as deemed appropriate. The ecclesiastical courts' concept
of alimony, however, seems to have been transferred to modern
divorce law without much critical thought. Of course, to attribute
the development of alimony law to a simple historical oversight
would be an erroneous and misleading generalization. As long as the
wife remained in her traditional role of taking care of domestic
chores while depending upon the husband to provide the economic
support, there was a definite need for alimony upon divorce to in-
sure the wife's continued financial stability, unless the wife was
adequately provided for by the disposition of the property.
Without going into the history of the development of the familial
relationship since early England, it is sufficient for the purposes of
this article to say that women today have increasingly broken out
of the traditional role of the common law wife. Women's rights have
* B.A., Washington and Lee University, 1973; J.D., University of Richmond Law School,
1977; Clerk, United States District Court for the Virgin Islands.
1. See FOOTE, LEVY AND SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw, 171-74 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as FooE].
2. See generally 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 5.50 to 5.56 (Casner ed. 1952).
3. See FOOTE, supra note 1, at 908.
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slowly become widely recognized in this country so that many
women are able to provide their own economic needs. With the
recognition of rights, however, comes another change-the imposi-
tion of duties. It is the impact of this development that has finally
begun to chip away at the once solid concept known as alimony.
In 1975, the Virginia General Assembly took note of this develop-
ment and revised title 20 so as to abolish the terms "alimony" and
"husband" from the code and replace them with the terms "support
and maintenance" and "spouse". 4 Coupled with the fact that the
Virginia Constitution, as redrafted in 1971, prohibited governmen-
tal discrimination based upon "religious conviction, race, color, sex
or national origin . . .,"I there is some question as to what impact
the statutory changes should have upon the present case law. As of
this time, there has been no significant change in the "alimony"
cases addressed by the Virgninia Supreme Court, other than a
switch to the terms "support and maintenance". This article will
analyze the revised statutes, which were amended again in 1977, in
light of the existing case law in an attempt to show that several
fundamental changes will have to be made by the Virginia Supreme
Court in the near future both as to alimony' and child support.
I. THE ROLE OF FAULT
Prior to 1975, the Virginia Supreme Court consistently reviewed
alimony as a substantive right of the wife. This fact is significant
since it led to a distinction between (1) being entitled to alimony
and (2) the actual amount of alimony received. In addressing this
first issue, courts have traditionally considered the role of fault since
courts felt the wife's right to alimony depended upon the conduct
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (amended 1977). See notes 39-57 infra, and
accompanying text.
5. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
6. It should be noted here that the term "alimony" will appear throughout this article even
though the Virginia statutes now use the terms "support and maintenance." The use of the
term "alimony" is necesary since all Virginia cases prior to 1975 use this term. Where there
is a need to distinguish between the terms "alimony" and "support and maintenance" the
author will point out the difference.
7. See, e.g., White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 168, 24 S.E.2d 448, 451 (1943) (alimony is a
"substantive right, which may be decreed to any wife under a given state of facts."); Branch
v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 251, 132 S.E. 303, 305 (1926) (alimony is a moral as well as legal
obligation of the husband).
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of the parties at the time of the divorce. As noted by the supreme
court in Eaton v. Davis,8 alimony "stems from the common-law
right of the wife to support by her husband, which right, unless the
wife by her own misconduct forfeits it, continues to exist even after
they cease to live together." 9 The attitude that the wife is entitled
to alimony as a matter of right if she is without fault in the marital
break-up has been supported by recent case law, ' but the 1975
statutory changes cast serious doubt on this view. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court apparently still feels the wife has a right to alimony
if she is without fault."
In revising the code section on support and maintenance, the
General Assembly added several provisions including the state-
ment: "Provided, however, that no permanent support and mainte-
nance for the spouse shall be awarded by the court from a spouse if
there exists in his or her favor a ground of divorce. ... 12
Obviously the General Assembly has completely abolished the
Supreme Court's concept of the wife's right to alimony,' 3 first by
inserting the word "spouse" into the statute and then by changing
the court's consideration of the fault of the parties. Instead of the
wife having a right to alimony unless fault on her part was shown,
now the role of fault is important only to see if a party should be
8. 176 Va. 330, 10 S.E,2d 893 (1940).
9. Id. at 338, 10 S.E.2d at 897.
10. See, e.g., Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 346, 210 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1974) (wife forfeits
her right to support only if her misconduct was the cause of the divorce); Monahan v.
Monahan, 212 Va. 406, 407, 184 S.E.2d 812, 813 (1971); Guy v. Guy, 210 Va. 536, 539, 172
S.E.2d 735, 737-38 (1970).
11. Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 504, 229 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976). While the court stated
that a wife has a right to support unless she is at fault, it does not appear that counsel for
the husband objected to this view. Thus, it could be assumed that the court has not addressed
the question of whether the wife no longer has an absolute right to alimony since apparently
no party has raised that argument on appeal.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (amended 1977). The change was not affected
by the 1977 amendments.
13. There can be no question that the General Assembly has the constitutional power to
change the law regarding the award of alimony since divorces a vinculo "are wholly creatures
of statute law." Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940). Since divorces a
mensa et thoro were adopted by the legislature from the common law, an argument could be
made that the new statutory provisions are unconstitutional as applied to such divorces. This
argument is not very strong since the legislature has the inherent power to codify and change
the common law. Surely such a distinction would lead to an absurd and unnecessary state of
confusion.
1977]
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prevented from obtaining alimony. However, even if the wife is not
at fault in the marital break-up, she is no longer entitled to alimony
per se. The fact that she was not at fault only allows her to proceed
further and try to show that she is entitled to alimony upon a con-
sideration of other factors." While the Virginia Supreme Court has
not yet recognized this change,'5 it must clearly do so in the near
future if the revised statutes are to be given their intended effect.
The changing role of fault is quite significant from the husband's
point of view. First, alimony can no longer be viewed as a punitive
measure against a husband who is the cause of the divorce."6 Regard-
less of the husband's fault, the wife has no right to alimony unless
she can show she meets the criteria for need under statute section
20-107. This same analysis applies to a no-fault divorce. Second,
since there is no right of the wife to support per se, failure of the
wife to show she is entitled to support at the time of the divorce
decree may completely relieve the husband of any further possible
obligations, absent special circumstances.
Ths second concept is somewhat complex, but it should lead to a
substantial change in the existing case law. Perhaps this concept
could be better understood by applying the revised statute to a
recent case decided just prior to the 1975 changes.
In Gagliano v. Gagliano,"7 the trial court found that the wife was
completely able to support herself and therefore was not entitled to
an award of alimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the court's find-
ing that the wife was not in need of any alimony at that time. The
court, however, went on to note that since the trial court had found
no fault on the part of Mrs. Gagliano, she had not forfeited her right
14. The General Assembly left the award of support and maintenance up to the discretion
of the trial court but listed several factors the court must consider in reaching its decision.
See note 28 infra, for a list of these factors.
15. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 504, 229 S.E,2d 887, 889 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Capell v. Capell, 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E. 894 (1935), where the court stated:
A decree for alimony is something more than an order for the payment of money. A
husband who has wronged his wife must continue to contribute to her support. A
decree for alimony "is an order compelling a husband to support his wife, and this is
a public as well as a marital duty-a moral as well as a legal obligation."
Id. at 49, 178 S.E. at 895 (citation omitted). Clearly this view of alimony is out-dated by the
1975 statutory changes.
17. 215 Va. 447, 211 S.E.2d 62 (1975). This case was decided a few months before the
revised title 20 became effective.
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to alimony. Therefore, the trial court was instructed to include an
express reservation in the divorce decree for future alimony if the
wife could show a need for it due to changed circumstances.'8 By
leaving open the possibility for future alimony should the wife be
unable to support herself, the court reaffirmed its view that a wife
who is not at fault has a right to alimony although at any given time
the amount she is actually entitled to receive may be zero if she is
currently able to support herself. Under the revised section on main-
tenance and support," the court's analysis in Gagliano would be
erroneous since the wife no longer has the right to alimony simply
because she is not at fault. The role of fault has been changed.
While the code does allow a trial court to increase or decrease a
previous award of support as the circumstances require, 20 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has interpreted this section to mean that a
trial court can alter a previous award of support only if such an
award was actually made or a power to make a later award was
expressly reserved by the trial court in the divorce decree .2 Under
the new law, however, a trial court cannot make such a reservation
simply because the wife was not at fault in the separation; instead,
the court must base such a reservation of power on the other factors
found in section 20-107. Thus, the reasoning in Gagliano is not
sufficient to remand a case under the new law. The trial court's
decision not to include such a reservation of power in the decree
must stand on appeal unless the lower court erred in not finding a
need for such a reservation under one of the criteria in section 20-
107. In short, before such a reservation of power to award possible
future support can be made, there must be more of a finding than
simply lack of fault by the wife. Otherwise, the husband must be
18. Id. at 452-53, 211 S.E.2d at 66.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
21. Perry v. Perry, 202 Va. 849, 120 S.E.2d 385 (1961) (failure to award support at the time
of the marital dissolution bars a later initial award since this would be more than a modifica-
tion unless the power was expressly reserved); Losyk v. Losyk, 212 Va. 220, 222, 183 S.E.2d
135, 137 (1971) (the language "with leave to either party to have the same reinstated for good
cause shown" found in the divorce decree was not a sufficient "express reservation" to allow
a court to invoke § 20-109 in order to make a subsequent award of alimony).
22. The basic reason for a court to include a reservation of power to award possible future
support to a spouse is to give the court continuing jurisdiction over the parties while granting
the relief of a final divorce as soon as possible. However, since the woman no longer has the
19771
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completely discharged of all his marital duties once the divorce is
final.
While the changing role of fault has not yet become apparent in
the cases decided since the statutory changes," it undoubtedly will
have its impact in the future. This change puts a greater burden on
the wife in a divorce suit since she must now show more than lack
of fault on her part in order to be entitled to support from her
husband. This fact will become even more obvious as the role of
women in our society progresses to the point where the vast majority
of women have careers and support themselves financially. As we
approach that point, the role of fault will diminish even further.
2
1
II. THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT TO BE GIVEN
Once the court has determined that a spouse is not at fault in the
marital break-up, the court can look further to see whether there
should be an award of any support.2 Under the new statutes, either
spouse is eligible to receive such an award, although at the present
right to alimony merely because she is not at fault, courts cannot make such a retention of
jurisdiction over the parties unless the wife shows a need for the court to do so, which was
not the situation in Gagliano. In short, courts cannot grant such a reservation of power over
the parties as a matter of routine, as was indicated in Gagliano.
The attempt to relieve the husband of all marital obligation as soon as possible is clearly
in line with other supreme court holdings. For example, the court has strictly construed
section 20-109 to mean that a court cannot later make an award of support if no such provision
were made at the time of the final decree. See note 21 supra, and the cases cited therein.
Obviously the court wants to protect the husband from the possible exposure at any time to
financial disruption due to events beyond his control after he has made financial committ-
ments in reliance upon the fact that he was released from all his marital duties. Accord,
McConkey v. McConkey, 216 Va. 106, 215 S.E.2d 640 (1975) (when former wife who is
receiving alimony enters into a voidable marriage, the husband is relieved of all duties even
if the later marriage is subsequently annulled).
23. As late as November, 1976, the supreme court still considered the wife to have a right
to support if she was not at fault in the marital break-up. Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502,
229 S.E.2d 887 (1976).
24. The UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DivoRca ACr § 308(b) has completely abolished any consid-
eration of marital misconduct in determining the amount of support to be given. For a
discussion of the role of fault in several other states, most of which have different statutory
provisions than Virginia, see 87 HAlv. L. REV. 1579 (1974).
25. Of course the parties can make a private agreement among themselves as to the amount
and then have the court make this agreement part of the final decree. It appears that once
the court has incorporated this agreement into the final decree, it has no power to later amend
the agreement without the consent of both parties since this would be a violation of the
constitutional right of the parties to enter into a contract that creates vested property rights.
Shoosmith v. Scott, 217 Va. 290, 227 S.E.2d 729 (1976).
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time it will normally be the wife who seeks such an award. This
article, therefore, will discuss the problem of determining the
amount of support to be given as if it is the wife who is seeking relief,
although it should be remembered that the parties could be reversed
today.
A. The 1975 Changes
Generally speaking, courts in Virginia have looked to two factors
in order to determine the amount of support to be awarded once it
has determined that the wife is entitled to some assistance. First,
courts have established the standard of living to which the wife has
become accustomed during the marriage." Second, courts have bal-
anced the husband's ability to pay with the wife's need for support.
27
The 1975 changes in the code listed six factors which the court must
consider in determining the amount of support to be given.r In
addition to codifying the existing case law, the legislature added
several considerations which indicate that the General Assembly
intended to place more of an obligation on the wife to support her-
self whenever possible.
Even though the trend towards equal rights for women may never
lead to an actual situation where the husband gets an award of
support from his wife, it will almost certainly lead to significant
reductions in the size of support awards given to the wife in many
26. See Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197, 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Robertson v. Robert-
son 215 Va. 425, 427, 211 S.E.2d 41, 44 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 201 Va. 731, 734, 113 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1960).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (amended 1977). These factors are:
(1) The earning capacity, obligations and needs, and financial resources of the
parties;
(2) The education and training of the parties and the ability and the opportunity
of the parties to secure such education and training;
(3) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) The duration of the marriage;
(5) The age, physical and mental condition of the parties; and
(6) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
In interpreting the phrase "earning capacity" in subsection (1), the Virginia Supreme Court
has construed this term to mean the amount one can potentially earn rather than one's actual
earnings at the time of divorce. Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 227 S.E.2d 688 (1976) (ability
to pay computed by husband's capacity to earn despite his desire to stay in a low paying
position-his decision should not be permitted to penalize his wife). See also Hawkins v.
Hawkins, 187 Va. 595, 47 S.E.2d 436 (1948).
1977]
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cases. For example, even where a husband clearly is without justifi-
cation in leaving his wife, a court will probably weigh the wife's
earning capacity, despite the fact she may not have ever worked
during the marriage, before determining what amount, if any, the
husband should pay.
The idea of forcing the woman to work if she is able and has the
opportunity to obtain employment is not new to Virginia case law.
In 1922 the Virginia Supreme Court refused to increase a request for
alimony by a woman recently divorced from a young lawyer, stating
that:
It must also be borne in mind that the appellee is a young woman,
only twenty-eight years of age, and that under modem conditions
there is open to her practically every avenue for making money that
is open to her husband, that by the decree of the court she is released
from her former household duties, that her time is her own, and that
she has no right to remain idle at the expense of her former husband,
and that it is her duty to minimize his loss, albeit it was through his
fault that she was compelled to ask that the contract of marriage be
rescinded.2"
While this case is clearly the exception rather than the rule at the
present time, courts are obviously moving in this direction. Another
case which is even more in line with the approach courts will proba-
bly take in the future is Baytop v. Baytop.30 Even though the divorce
was not the wife's fault and despite the fact her husband appeared
to be financially able to give her some support, the court refused to
give the wife alimony since she had always earned enough money
on her own 31 to amply support herself.
32
29. Barnard v. Barnard, 132 Va. 155, 164, 111 S.E. 227, 230 (1922). The court quoted
Barnard with approval in Babcock v. Babcock, 172 Va. 219, 225, 1 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1939),
where it denied alimony to a woman married to a relatively older gentleman. The court found
that the wife was more capable of earning a living than her former husband so that she should
not be able to look to him for support. See also Brauer v. Brauer, 215 Va. 62, 66-67, 205 S.E.2d
665, 668 (1974) (court said in dicta that a wife with the ability to work must do so).
30. 199 Va. 388, 100 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
31. Id. at 395, 100 S.E.2d at 19. One factor that the court may have considered significant
was that the wife had lived apart from her husband for most of the marriage, having a job in
a different town. Obviously the wife had not relied too heavily on her husband for support.
32. See also Gagliano v. Gagliano, 215 Va. 447, 451-52, 211 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1975) (there can
be no award of alimony where the wife can presently support herself).
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There should also be another change in how alimony is deter-
mined as the courts shift their scrutiny from whether the husband
should pay (because it is his duty to support his wife) to whether
the wife can support herself. At the present time, the general rule
appears to be that the wife's own personal estate does not have any
bearing on the husband's obligation to pay alimony. In 1946, the
Supreme Court of Virginia in Ring v. Ring33 rejected the contention
that the wife's own affluence should be a factor in determining
alimony, stating:
While it is true, as shown by the record, that appellee is possessed of
a sizeable estate, there is no rule of law that requires her to expend
her estate to ameliorate the condition of appellant, brought about by
his faithlessness to his marriage vows.34
It is uncertain whether this rule is applicable only when the hus-
band's actions are the cause of the divorce (so that the rule is penal
in nature) or whether the rule applies any time the wife is entitled
to support. Regardless of the scope of the rule, it clearly cannot still
be valid today.
In amending the statute section regarding the award of mainte-
nance and support, the legislature expressly included "the financial
resources of the parties"35 as a factor to be considered. This enact-
ment obviously is intended to overrule the Ring holding. It should
be noted that there is some case law to this effect, although it is
quite old. In Myers v. Myers,36 which has never been expressly over-
ruled, the wife was granted a divorce on the grounds of cruelty by
her husband, yet her request for alimony was denied since she was
found to have an ample estate of her own. 3 Even if Myers was
overruled by Ring, there can be no question that Ring is no longer
33. 185 Va. 269, 38 S.E.2d 471 (1946).
34. Id. at 273-74, 38 S.E.2d at 473. This view was reaffirmed in Klotz v. Klotz, 203 Va.
677, 680, 127 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1962), where the court noted that a wife should not be required
to dispose of her own property to support herself when it was her husband's actions that led
to the divorce.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Repl. Vol. 1975) (amended 1977). See note 28 supra.
36. 83 Va. 806, 6 S.E. 630 (1887).
37. Id. at 815, 6 S.E. at 635. The court also refused to award child support since the wife
had her own separate estate. See also Hulcher v. Hulcher, 177 Va. 12, 18, 12 S.E.2d 767, 769
(1941) (husband allowed a reduction in alimony payments where former spouse inherited an
estate even though husband's conduct was the original cause of the divorce).
1977]
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good law in light of the 1975 amendments to section 20-107. Thus,
now a wife's separate estate can be considered in determining the
award of support."
While a husband can now theoretically receive support from his
former wife, the greatest impact of the amended statute will be the
heavier burden on the wife to show a need for support. The change
will also lead to a significant reduction in the amount of support
the wife will receive. The day when a wife who was unjustifiably
deserted by her husband could expect a sizeable recovery as a
matter of course is but a fleeting memory.
B. The 1977 Changes
The General Assembly amended section 20-107 in 197711 after
considering four separate proposals. 0 The changes which were fi-
nally adopted by the legislature are quite significant and could sig-
nal the beginning of several new concepts in the law of domestic
relations in Virginia. Of course, the judicial interpretation given to
the amendments to section 20-107 will be crucial in determining
how much the law will evolve.
The first change made was the addition of two more factors to be
considered in determining the amount of support to be given.4 The
first factor which was added basically requires the court to legally
recognize the contribution of the homemaker 2 in determining the
38. The 1977 amendments also lead to this conclusion. See note 44 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
39. 1977 Va. Acts ch. 475. The new amendments became effective July 1, 1977.
40. All fou proposed changes dealt primarily with two things: (1) the division of property
held by husband and wife at the time of divorce, including the family home; and (2) the
consideration of the nonmonetary contributions of the parties in determining the amount of
support. H. B. 1738, 1739, 1741 & 1742, General Assembly, 1977 Sess. The legislature finally
passed an amended version of H. B. 1742. For a list of the other factors and a discussion
thereof, see note 28 supra, and accompanying text.
41. The two factors are (1) the monetary and nonmonetary contributions of each party to
the well-being of the family and (2) the property interests of the parties. VA. CODE ANN. §
20-107(5)(a) and (b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The amendment states that the court must
consider: "(5a) The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-
being of the family."
While the statute specifically mentions both the monetary and nonmonetary contributions
of the parties, the significant addition is the inclusion of the nonmonetary contributions. This
factor requires a court for the first time to consider the role of a housewife in awarding
[Vol. 12:139
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amount of support to be awarded. While the language of the statute
is neutral on its face, the practical effect of this amendment is that
the wife, who is traditionally the homemaker, 3 will be able to use
her status as a housewife to justify a request for support.
It is uncertain how courts will interpret this directive from the
legislature, but an argument could be made that a wife who has
never worked cannot now be forced to work, even though she is able
to do so, if she has contributed significantly to the "well-being" of
the family. This analysis is obviously an extreme view, but courts
are certain to have difficulty in weighing this factor. It is unlikely
that a wife who has never worked, but is able to do so, will be
allowed to use this section to automatically get support. The legisla-
ture did include the term "monetary" to balance out any overem-
phasis on the nonmonetary contributions. Thus, some sort of com-
promise between the two factors will have to be reached which will
probably require some direction from the Virginia Supreme Court.
While this new factor obviously will help the wife in most cases, it
is certainly not designed to defeat the over-all intent of section 20-
107 that a wife who is able to provide for herself adequately must
do so.
The second factor added by the 1977 amendments" merely makes
the requirement that a court consider the financial resources of both
parties more explicit. 5 The addition to section 20-107 expressly
states that a court must consider both the real and personal inter-
ests of each party. By the inclusion of this factor there can be no
question that the legislature has abolished the rule in Ring v. Ring
so that the wife's separate estate must be considered in determining
the amount of support to be awarded.
support. Many courts have always considered this factor, but the statute now expressly
requires all courts to do so, thus giving the homemaker more leverage in asserting his or her
role. The inclusion of the word "monetary" is designed primarily to offset the significance of
the word "nonmonetary", so that courts would not overreact to the new change in considering
the nonmonetary contributions, especially in determining custody of the child.
43. Of course, if the husband is the homemaker, he can also assert this fact under the
amended statute.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The amendment provides that the court
must consider:
(5b) The property interests of the parties, both real and personal.
45. See notes 33-37 supra, and accompanying text.
46. 185 Va. 269, 38 S.E.2d 471 (1946).
1977]
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The last change made by the 1977 General Assembly is probably
the most significant in light of the impact it may have on the law
of domestic relations in Virginia. Before discussing the actual
amendments made by the legislature, however, it will be necessary
to go into certain prior developments in the Virginia law.
In 1958, the Virginia Supreme Court held in Smith v. Smith47 that
a court in a divorce proceeding had jurisdiction to make a division
of property owned jointly by the husband and wife. 8 Thus, in addi-
tion to awarding alimony, a court could divide up the furniture, the
house and any other property among the parties as the court deemed
appropriate. The legislature then amended section 20-107 in 1962 in
order to narrowly define the term "estate" to mean only the rights
created by marriage in the real property of the other spouse,49 such
as the rights of dower and curtesy. The supreme court strictly con-
strued this new definition in 1970 when it said in Guy v. Guy" that
courts no longer had jurisdiction to decide the issue of ownership of
jointly owned property such as furniture and furnishings. While the
court has modified this holding slightly in later cases,5 the basic
rule has prevailed that a court has no power to divide up jointly
owned property.1
2
Perhaps the primary reason for the legislature to desire such a rule
is that often third parties who are not before the court in the divorce
proceeding have an interest in the property in question. For exam-
47. 200 Va. 77, 104 S.E.2d 17 (1958).
48. Id. at 84-85, 104 S.E.2d at 23-24. The supreme court reached this decision by broadly
construing the term "estate" in section 20-107 to include more than just the marital rights of
the parties. The court felt that the term "estate", which it had power to divide, covered all
property owned jointly by the husband and wife, as well as other marital property rights.
49. The supreme court had noted in Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104 S.E.2d 17 (1958), that
the legislature could re-define the term "estate" if it desired an interpretation different than
that given by the court. Id. at 86, 104 S.E.2d at 24.
50. 210 Va. 536, 541, 172 S.E.2d 735, 738-39 (1970).
51. For example, a court may award a lump sum payment in addition to regular payments
so that a deserving spouse can furnish a residence upon divorce. Turner v. Turner, 213 Va.
42, 43-44, 189 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1972). Furthermore, a court can order the deserting spouse to
replace any furniture removed from the apartment by him with a "suitable" substitute.
Robertson v. Robertson, 215 Va. 425, 430, 211 S.E.2d 41, 45-46 (1975).
52. See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, 211 Va. 718, 180 S.E.2d 500 (1971), where the court held
that a house owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety was not a right created
by the marriage and hence a court in a divorce proceeding did not have jurisdiction to award
the house to the wife as part of an award of alimony.
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ple, the bank may have a security interest in the family car or house;
yet, the bank is not before the court in the divorce proceeding and
thus would have no say in how its security interest is handled by
the court. On the other hand, the rule established by the legislature
has led to a certain amount of disruption in the settlement of a
divorce, since the parties must not only litigate the divorce itself but
they may also have to litigate the question of property rights in a
separate suit if they cannot reach an agreement among themselves.
The General Assembly in its 1977 amendments to section 20-107
has attempted to alleviate some of the problems caused by the
division of the property interests of the parties. First, the legislature
completely abolished the term "estate" from the section so that it
only deals with the award of maintenance and support and not the
division of the estate." Second, the legislature added the following
provision:
In addition to or in lieu of periodic payments for maintenance and
support of a spouse, the court may, in its discretion, award a lump
sum payment, based upon consideration of the property interests of
the parties except those acquired by gift or inheritance during the
marriage."
While the Virginia Supreme Court has already stated that a court
could award a lump sum payment in addition to regular support
payments in order for a spouse to furnish a residence upon divorce,"5
the statute goes well beyond that holding.
It should be noted that a court can only order a lump sum pay-
ment of money. It still cannot divide the property itself up among
the parties; therefore, interested third parties are still protected. A
court in its discretion can, however, order one lump sum payment
to be made by considering the value of the property interests of the
parties excluding property acquired by gift or inheritance. The
amendment becomes quite significant when one considers the effect
it will have. For example, assume that the husband earns $18,000 a
year and the wife earns $10,000. Furthermore, assume the two live
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
54. Id.
55. Turner v. Turner, 213 Va. 42, 43-44, 189 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1972).
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in a house owned by the husband which is worth $30,000. If the court
feels that the wife should have the house upon divorce of the parties
and this award will be sufficient to satisfy her needs,then the court
could order the husband to pay the wife $30,000. The indirect result
would probably be that the husband would deed the house to the
wife in satisfaction of his obligation to her. Although this example
is oversimplified, the basic result is certainly possible under the
amended statute.
It is hard to say at this time how the courts will react to this part
of the amended statute. Third party creditors may still be pro-
tected, but courts can now do indirectly what Guy v. Guy-" prohibits
them from doing directly: divide the property acquired during mar-
riage. Obviously this change could have a profound impact on the
future case law.
Although there has been a general shift towards lowering the
amount of support awarded to the wife and raising the burden of
proving that one should receive such an award, the 1977 amend-
ments definitely favor the spouse who has primarily been a home-
maker. A spouse who is able to provide her own needs will still not
be able to receive support, but courts now must be cognizant of
the fact that a person has made nonmonetary contributions to the
household in making an award of support. Furthermore, now that
courts may order lump sum payments in lieu of regular payments,
there may be a significant change in the tactics of the parties in
settling divorce cases. The 1977 amendments will undoubtedly play
a significant role in the future in determining the amount of support
to be awarded.
III. CHILD SUPPORT
While it may be unreasonable to expect a husband to be awarded
support from his former wife, the recent statutory changes could
realistically lead to an increase in the obligations of the wife to
56. 210 Va. 536, 541, 172 S.E.2d 735, 738-39 (1970).
57. The UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DivoRCE AcT § 308 encourages the division of the marital
property as the primary method for providing for the anticipated financial requirements of
the parties rather than support payments. The act authorizes the award of support payments
only when the division of the marital property is not sufficient to provide for the respective
parties.
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contribute to child support, especially where custody is given to the
father."' Many jurisdictions have adopted this view where the
mother is financially capable of making such a contribution. 5r Since
many divorced women do work, it would not be at all unusual to
find the wife able to contribute significantly to child support.
Although it is a misdemeanor in Virginia for either parent to fail
to provide support for a minor child,"0 the older Virginia case law
only discusses the father's duty to continue to provide child support
upon divorce." Indeed, prior to the 1975 revision of section 20-107,
the code did not expressly empower a court to require a wife to pay
child support upon divorce, although this power could have been
inferred.6" However, the amended section 20-107 does provide for
such duty to be imposed upon the wife by substituting the word
''spouse" in place of the word "husband".
Naturally, the cause of the divorce has nothing to do with the
requirement of child support since the court is concerned here solely
with the best interest of the child. 3 Courts should now become more
conscious of the wife's ability to provide child support. Undoubtedly
a court would be quicker in making the wife pay child support than
it would be in forcing the wife to support her former spouse."
58. In Virginia there is no presumption in favor of either parent regarding custody of the
children upon divorce. Instead, the best interests of the individual child is to be the sole
consideration in awarding custody. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1973). However, the
supreme court has often stated that "all things being equal" the mother is the natural
guardian of children of tender years. See, e.g., White v. White, 215 Va. 765, 767, 213 S.E.2d
766, 768 (1975). Nevertheless, courts today are far more likely to consider giving custody to
the father. See, e.g., Burnside v. Burnside, 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976); Portewig v.
Ryder, 208 Va. 791, 160 S.E.2d 789 (1968). Furthermore, in our society today it would not be
unusual for a career-oriented woman to not desire complete custody of the children. Thus,
it is entirely conceivable that the wife will be ordered to contribute to child support in many
circustances.
59. For a discussion of several different cases which have held the wife must contribute to
child support where she is able to do so, see 77 W. VA. L. REv. 808 (1975).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
61. See, e.g., Gramelspacher v. Gramelspacher, 204 Va. 839, 134 S.E.2d 285 (1964); Oliver
v. Oliver, 202 Va. 268, 117 S.E.2d 59 (1960); Bundy v. Bundy, 197 Va. 795, 91 S.E.2d 412
(1956); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921).
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
63. See, e.g., Stolfi v. Stolfi, 203 Va. 696, 126 S.E.2d 923 (1962) (the husband's duty to
provide child support is not diminished simply because the wife was at fault in the marital
break-up).
64. The spouse paying both child support and "alimony" must be careful to pay the other
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the 1975 and 1977 amendments to section 20-
107 of the Virginia Code should have a tremendous impact on the
future developments in the award of support upon divorce. Since
the wife no longer has a right to support merely because she is not
at fault in the marital break-up, she will have to demonstrate both
a clear need for support and an inability on her part to provide that
support. If she has her own ample separate estate, she will not be
allowed to receive assistance. Furthermore, if she is perfectly able
to support herself and there is no evidence that she will be unable
to continue to support herself in the future, the husband must be
relieved of all marital obligations. Courts can no longer routinely
reserve the power to make a possible future award unless the wife
demonstrates a need for the court to do so.
Obviously the wife will have a greater burden than in the past in
showing that she should be given support from her former spouse.
On the other hand, courts must consider the nonmonetary contribu-
tions of the homemaker, a factor which will generally benefit
women. This amendment is certainly consistent with the general
principles of equity and hopefully will assist the truly deserving
spouse in receiving support. Likewise, the amendment allowing the
court to order a lump sum payment should also benefit women since
traditionally the husband accumulates the family wealth in his own
name. Certainly that change in the law is the most significant one
in terms of its potential impact on future support settlements.
The effect all of this will have on the decisions of the Virginia
Supreme. Court is hard to speculate. To date, the court has not
implemented any significant changes. The supreme court has, how-
ever, shown a stronger tendency to defer to the trial court's discre-
tion unless there is clearly an error in the trial court's award.65 It will
spouse rather than the child directly unless the portion attributable to child support is
specifically designated as such. Otherwise the payment to the child will not discharge the
obligation to the former spouse. Fearon v. Fearon, 207 Va. 927, 931-32, 154 S.E.2d 165, 168
(1967). However, checks made payable to the child but received and disbursed by the desig-
nated spouse are deemed to be sufficient payment on the support obligation. See Gagliano
v. Gagliano, 215 Va. 447, 211 S.E.2d 62 (1975).
65. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 504, 229 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976), where the
court refused to alter the size of the award since there was no evidence in the record which
would justify a change. Of course, the supreme court has always deferred to the trial court's
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be interesting to see how the court will address the holdings in Ring
v. Ring," regarding the wife's separate estate, and Gagliano v.
Gagliano,17 regarding when a court should reserve its jurisdiction
over the parties.
Hopefully the supreme court will recognize the changes which the
legislature intended to make since the revised statutes are more in
line with the woman's role in society today. The West Virginia Su-
preme Court was faced with similar questions in 1974 and appar-
ently departed little from the traditional view of alimony.8 The
West Virginia legislature had amended the state code69 in a way very
similar to revised title 20 of the Virginia Code. When faced with
adopting the new statutory changes, however, in place of the tradi-
tional standards regarding alimony, in the case of Corbin v.
Corbin, the West Virginia court apparently opted for a compromise
between the two approaches. The court first acknowledged the
amended statutory view that either spouse was entitled to support
but then reverted to the traditional view that support was a right
of the wife to be determined by the husband's ability to pay in
relation to the station in life to which the wife had become accus-
tomed during marriage.7' As a result of the Corbin holding, the
purpose of the new statutory changes was substantially diluted.
7 2
The statutory changes made by the Virginia General Assembly
are not an attempt to deprive a deserving wife of support. Instead,
the changes are actually a necessary step towards dealing with the
marital relationship as it exists in light of women's emerging role in
our society today. Indeed, the amended support statute even pro-
discretion whenever possible, but the cases seem to indicate that the court is being more
deferential in the more recent decisions. The same is true regarding custody of the child. See,
e.g., Burnside v. Burside, 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976); Portewig v. Ryder, 208 Va.
791, 160 S.E.2d 789 (1968).
66. 185 Va. 269, 38 S.E.2d 471 (1946). See note 33 supra, and accompanying text.
67. 215 Va. 447, 211 S.E.2d 62 (1975). See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
68. Corbin v. Corbin, 206 S.E.2d 898 (W.Va. 1974). See generally 77 W. VA. L. Rav. 808
(1975).
69. 1969 W. Va. Acts ch. 49, § § 48-2-1 to -31. For a discussion of these changes, see 72 W.
VA. L. REv. 104 (1970).
70. 206 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1974).
71. Id. at 903-04.
72. Accord, 77 W. VA. L. Rav. 808 (1975). "As evidenced by. . . Corbin ... the court
has not exclusively bound itself to the letter or the spirit of these revised domestic relations
statutes and will continue to apply traditional standards." Id. at 814-15.
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vides for situations which the old law did not really contemplate by
directing the court to consider other equities which exist between
the parties. 3 For example, if a wife works while putting her husband
through college and the two are divorced shortly after the husband's
graduation, the wife might not be able to recover any support and
maintenance from the husband since she always provided the fam-
ily income. She cannot show a need or a standard of living to which
she became accustomed while depending on the husband. Under the
new statute, a court could force the husband to support his former
spouse while she obtained a college degree as this would certainly
be a proper exercise of a court's equitable powers. Once the wife
earned her degree, the award of support would cease. Clearly such
a situation was not contemplated by the common law approach to
alimony.
In summary, it is obvious that the legislature intended to change
the traditional concept of alimony in order to conform to the chang-
ing attitudes regarding the role of the sexes today. These statutory
changes are certainly sensible and should be implemented more
fully by the courts. Hopefully the future case law will adopt the view
that no longer can the divorced wife merely sit at home and wait
for the check to come. While few husbands will ever get an award
of support themselves, unless absolutely destitute, the wife will
have a harder time getting a decree of support, and when she does,
the amount will be smaller.
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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